The Operation and Object of the Intellect

Article 2. The Operation and Object of the Intellect

a) Operation of the Intellect

The first and basic operation of the human intellect is the activity called simple apprehending or simple knowing, and this consists in the forming of concepts or ideas. When we say “forming” we do not mean that the intellect “makes up” its elements of knowledge. On the contrary. We mean that the intellect is operative to take in in its own way (hence the word “forming”) the understandable realities which constitute its object. In a somewhat similar way the senses may be said to “form” their knowledge,—not by creating it or projecting it ready-made out of themselves, but by taking it in in a manner consistent with their own nature, structure, and function. Thus sight may be said to “form” the sense-knowledge of visible objects by laying hold of the intra-organic visual image whereby it actually sees realities in the outer trans-subjective world. It sees objects that are there; it brings them into itself as seen objects. But, manifestly, it does not transfer them, with body and bulk, into the organ of vision or into the sense of sight. It leaves them where they are and as they are (“in their objective otherness”) and takes them in by image or similitude or species, in a manner consonant and consistent with its nature as a seeing-faculty. Thus also intellect takes in knowables in essential image or species suited to the nature and operation of a supra-sentient knowing-power. Intellect knows in a manner indicated by the intent of nature; that is, it knows as the Creator has designed it for knowing; and for this reason we say that the intellect knows by forming intentional images or intentional species of things. In other words the intellect takes in reality in its own way and in so far “forms” reality within itself. Every receiver takes things in according to its own capacity and character: hence the Latin axiom, Quidquid accipitur ad modum accipientis accipitur, that is, “Whatever is taken in is received according to the capacity and character of the receiver.” Now, the point we make is that while intellect takes in reality according to its own capacity and character (and in so far “forms” reality within itself), it does actually take in reality and does not produce knowledge out of itself as a figment divorced from reality.

The intellect “forms” or takes in reality. Now the full and complete activity of intellectually knowing is not the simple taking in, but the having and possessing of knowledge fully formed. Therefore, we discern at once two clearly distinct phases of intellectual activity; and we have a special name for the intellect in either phase of this activity. We say that the intellect, inasmuch as it actively performs the operations necessary to make objects intelligible or understandable and to bring these in that it may possessively lay hold upon them, is the active intellect or the agent intellect or, in the Latin term by which this faculty is usually called, the intellectus agens. And the intellect, inasmuch as it receives, holds, and employs the knowledge which its activity brings to it, is the passive intellect or the intellectus possibilis. The term “passive” is not to be understood here as meaning lifeless passivity; it indicates a vital reaction on the part of the intellect to the impressed elements of supra-sensuous knowledge; it suggests the serene yet active possession of reality in fully formed intellectual concepts or ideas. The intellectus agens is the intellect inasmuch as it gets and impresses the elements of supra-sensuous knowledge; the intellectus possibilis is the intellect inasmuch as it has and can now use acquired supra-sensuous knowledge.

In discussing the operation of the intellect we have first to consider the forming of ideas or concepts by the action of the intellectus agens and the possessive re-action of the intellectus possibilis. This forming and having of ideas is called the activity of simple apprehending; it is the first and fundamental operation of the intellect. The second operation is that in which the intellect inspects and compares ideas, notices identities and differences and relations, and judges or pronounces on the agreement or disagreement of the ideas: this operation is called judging. The third and last operation of the intellect is the working out of judgments which are not at once apparent upon the comparison of ideas; this operation is called reasoning. Thus there are three intellectual operations, to wit, simple apprehending, judging, reasoning. We study each operation very briefly.

1, Simple Apprehending—The senses perceive their respective objects as material, concrete, individual things; and, indeed, it is thus that these objects exist in nature. The sense-findings are retained and held “re-present” in the inner sense called imagination. Recall here that imagination is not the fancy of poet or story-teller; it is an interior sense which, as its first and basic function, faithfully records, represents, retains, and evokes the findings of the exterior senses.

The sense-findings, re-present in imagination with all their concrete individuality and material circumstance, are subjected to the action of the intellectus agens and so are rendered intelligible or understandable. This result is due to the fact that the intellectus agens, like a great X-ray, illumines the imaged sense-findings and strips away, or renders invisible, their individuating marks and material conditions, and lays bare the understandable essence as such. This understandable essence is called the intelligible species. To illustrate all this: Suppose you have never seen or heard of the reality called triangle. Now you see several pictures of triangle drawn on a blackboard. No two of the pictures are alike in color or location or size; no two are of the same type of triangle (isosceles, scalene; right triangle, equilateral, etc.). Your sight lays hold of the pictures as sensile objects; you know then sentiently. The finding of sight is reflected, so to speak, inwardly to the imagination and reproduced there; the pictures are present on the blackboard, and re-present in the imagination. Now the intellectus agens turns its view and its light upon the images present in imagination, and sees that the pictures, despite the differences of size, color, position and type, are all pictures of one and the same kind of thing. To put the point differently: the intellectus agens illumines the concrete and individual pictures re-present in imagination, and in its light concreteness and individuality fall away, and the essence which each picture represents lies revealed as this one kind of thing. The essence triangle (that which triangle itself means, regardless of size, type, color, position) is now an abstracted essence, an understandable essence, an intelligible species. This species is called an abstracted essence because the intellectus agens, in its operation of illumining or contemplating the images in imagination, neglects to consider the non-essential points in which each image differs from the others and focusses upon the essential point in which all the images are the same: and this operation is called abstracting (or abstraction). The term abstraction is from the Latin ab “away; from” and traho “I draw,” and means that the intellect draws away the essence from the individual marks and material conditions in which that essence is, in nature, clothed and expressed. The intellect (i. e., the intellectus agens) draws away or draws out the essence and renders it capable of being grasped by itself, or as such, or formally. In a word, the intellectus agens, by abstracting an essence from non-essentials, renders that essence understandable or intelligible,—turns it into an intelligible species.

The intellect, therefore, by its power of abstraction, renders sense-objects intelligible. This done, the same intellectus agens which exercised the operation of abstracting, takes up, so to speak, the intelligible species or abstracted essence and impresses this upon the intellect as understanding (i. e., the intellectus possibilis). The abstracted essence or intelligible species is now the impressed species. The intellectus possibilis reacts to the impression, laying hold of the impressed species under standingly, possessively, knowingly. This reactive, possessive grasp of the intellectus possibilis is said to express the understood essence, and the intelligible species is now the expressed species. The expressed intelligible species is an essence grasped, an essence understood, an essence intellectually known: it is called an idea or concept. Ideas are the fundamental elements of intellectual knowledge, of judging, and of reasoning.

Review the process of intellection,—that is, of intellectual understanding,—and notice how sensation, —or sentient knowing,—contrasts with it. (cr) The exterior senses know their respective objects by taking in a sentient image or sensible impressed species of these objects. This species is an intra-organic image, and by its wholly objective mediation, the sense reacts to know the actual sensible object there trans-subjectively present. Stirred, so to speak, into action by the impressed species, the exterior sense reacts to perceive the concrete, individual object which is there present in nature to be perceived. Thus the exterior senses do not express a species, but round out their knowing-action by perceiving the actual object concretely present. (&) The interior senses of imagination and memory can summon up and represent (evoke) their object when it is no longer actually present exteriorly; in other words, they express their objects in sensile species. Hence these interior senses do express a species. Even when the exterior object is present to the outer senses, imagination expresses it (“re-presents” it) in an expressed species, (c) The intellect always expresses a species; it rounds out its knowing-act by laying hold of an abstracted essence, and essences do not exist in an abstracted condition in nature outside the mind. The intellect knows essences as such, and expresses them so within itself. And the mark of the intelligible expressed species is always universality and abstractness. When, for example, the intellect has (through the service of abstraction on the part of the intellectus agens) laid hold of, and expressed within itself, the essence triangle, it has now and henceforth forever the knowledge of triangle as such,—of a triangle, any triangle, every triangle thinkable. Thus in one single expressed species it holds the essence of innumerable possible realities (triangles) which may vary widely in non-essentials as individual things. This is saying that the single expressed species (or idea) of triangle is a universal idea, that is, an idea which represents one essence capable of actualization in a plurality of individuals,—unum-versus-alia, “one thing as contrasted with other things”; one mental grasp as contrasted with the many things that may have the essence grasped; universal. Thus we say that the mind clothes reality with universality, not in the sense that the mind “makes up” a fictitious mask for reality, but in the sense that the mind can and does take in reality by laying hold of essences as abstracted from individuality and concreteness. Things in nature cannot exist except in an individual and concrete way, but the mind can and does express within itself that which exists, but in the mind’s own way which dispenses with 3i the individuality and concreteness of the object as ex-istible. Thus we justify our statement that the mark of understanding, of the intelligible species expressed in intellect, is always universality and abstractness.

The expressed intelligible species has many names that we must notice and understand. These are the following:

(a) The idea. This term is derived from the Greek eidos, “an image.” And we have seen that the expressed species is indeed an image; not a picture, which is a concrete and individual image, but an imaged essence expressed within the intellect. An idea is the grasp of the essence of a thing; it is the essence of a thing held in expressed species in the intellect.

(&) The simple apprehension. The intellect in forming an idea or expressing a species apprehends an essence, knows it intellectually. And the intellect makes no affirmation or denial about the essence so apprehended; it grasps it simply. Hence the action of the intellect in forming the idea is called simple apprehending, and the idea itself, which is the fruit of this simple apprehending, is called the simple apprehension. A simple apprehension is merely the unqualified grasp of an essence.—To avoid confusion, the student is warned that the word in -ion (that is, apprehension) is often used loosely as synonymous with the word in -ing (that is, apprehending}, and the process or operation of forming the idea is called simple apprehension. It will be wiser, however, for the student to employ the -ion word as a synonym for idea or expressed intelligible species, and to keep the -ing word to designate the action or operation of intellect in forming the idea.

(c) The concept. The intellect is, so to speak, impregnated by the impressed intelligible species and conceives the essence within itself as an expressed intelligible species or idea.

(d) The expressed species or species expressa. The intellect is said to express within itself the essence which it understands or apprehends. We have already given a detailed explanation of this term.

(e) The mental term or the intellectual term. This name for the idea is justified in two ways: first, the idea is the finished product, the terminus or term, of the intellectual operation called simple apprehending; secondly, the idea is, so to speak, a mental word or term applied by the intellect to an understood essence. Sometimes the idea is called a mental word. It is as though the intellect, receiving the impressed species, reacts to know and call an essence by a name or word in the action of expressing the species.

2. Judging—The second operation of the intellect is that in which the mind, comparing two ideas, notices points of identity or difference, and pronounces that they agree or disagree. This act of pronouncing on the agreement or disagreement of two ideas is called judging, and the pronouncement itself is the judgment.

Simple apprehending begets the idea; judging begets the judgment. In forming the idea, the intellect grasps an essence, grasps it simply as presented and expresses it simply within itself, making no pronouncement about its relation to any other idea. In judging, the intellect takes ideas already formed, compares one with another, notices agreement or disagreement, and pronounces its findings. Ideas are the elements of knowledge, but judgments are the fundamental processes of thought. In the judgment, and not, strictly speaking, in the idea, is discerned truth or falsity.

Suppose the mind is equipped with the ideas circle and roundness. When these ideas are brought into comparison, it is at once apparent to the intellect that they agree, for the idea of circle involves the idea of roundness, the one essence includes or presupposes the other. Therefore the intellect pronounces judgment, “A circle is round.” This is an immediate judgment, a self-evident judgment; it is a judgment which is inevitable once the two ideas concerned in it are clearly formed and brought into comparison.

When the intellect pronounces judgment, it affirms or denies that one idea agrees with another, and its pronouncement is called a predication. For one of the two ideas pronounced upon is that of or about which the other is affirmed or denied; one is the _subjects_dea of which the other is predicated.

Suppose that the mind possesses the ideas man and animal. Analyzing the idea man, the intellect sees that it is a compound idea, that it is made up of six component ideas, namely,.being (or thing), substance, body, living, sentient, rational. Analyzing the idea animal, the intellect sees that this also is a compound idea made up of the same components as the idea man with the exception of the last; for animal means an essence that is a thing or being, a substance, a body, a living body, a sentient body. Inasmuch as the ideas man and animal are in agreement (for the idea man is seen to contain all the component ideas of the idea animal), the intellect renders judgment, “Man is an animal.” Inasmuch, however, as the idea animal does not measure up to the full comprehension of the idea man (for animal lacks the sixth component idea or “note” of the idea man, viz., rational being), the intellect renders judgment, “Man is not a non-rational animal,” and, “Man is a rational animal.”

The “materials” of judgment,—to employ the term figuratively,—are two ideas noted and compared by the intellect. The form or essential constituting factor of the judgment is the pronouncement of the intellect upon the agreement or disagreement of the two ideas.

5. Reasoning—Often the intellect is unable to render judgment by making a simple comparison of ideas. For the two ideas compared may not be clear and distinct; the intellect may not know them in their implications, and so there is not sufficient evidence in the ideas as known to warrant judgment. In this case the intellect must reach judgment by a roundabout process. It calls upon a third idea which is known in relation to the original two, and through this as a medium it reaches the evidence required for judgment. Suppose that the intellect has the ideas “A” and “B,” but is unable,to pronounce judgment on their agreement or disagreement. Suppose further that the intellect has a third idea “C,” and that it knows this idea in relation to the other two, and is therefore able to pronounce two judgments which express this relation, thus: “A” is “C”; and “B” is “C.” From these two judgments the intellect concludes that “A” is “B.” Thu J through a median or middle idea (a “common third” idea) which it employs in two preliminary judgments or premises, the intellect is enabled to reach the judgment originally sought (indeed, the intellect inevitably knows this judgment from the premises), and sets this forth as a conclusion or consequent.

The intellect, as we have seen, reaches the conclusion “A” is “B” in this way:

“A” is “C,f

“B” is “C”

Therefore “A” is “B”

But if the relation of “C” to the other ideas were known to be the following:

“A” is “C”

“B” is not “C”

the intellect would necessarily draw the conclusion, that is, would pronounce the judgment sought from the start: Therefore, “A” is not “B.”

Now, this process of reaching a judgment which is not evident upon the comparison of two ideas, by employing a third or middle idea in two premise-judgments and so reaching a conclusion, is called mediate inference or simply reasoning.

Reasoning is called mediate inference because it uses a medium. The intellect in making self-evident judgments exercises immediate inference because no medium is required or used. Reasoning is always mediate inference.

There are two methods of reasoning, and the choice of method is dictated by the nature of the case investigated by the mind. Sometimes the mind or intellect reaches judgment (i. e., a conclusion, a mediate inference) by working from individual instances or singular data to a general conclusion. The intellect in this case works on the principle or guiding truth that, “What is true or false of the individual members of a class, is true or false of the class as a whole.” Take an illustration:

Lead, zinc, iron, gold, etc., are heavier than water;

Now, lead, zinc, iron, gold, etc., are all the known metals;

Therefore, all the known metals are heavier than water.

Here we see that the knowledge of individual data enables the mind to reach a universal conclusion. The mind is, so to speak, led in from single instances to a conclusion about the whole class which is instanced in the individual data. The Latin for “led in” is indue tus, and this method of reasoning is called induction. Induction is the method of reasoning employed by all the laboratory sciences. For this reason it has been called “the scientific method.” But the opinion that this method is the only method, or that it stands opposed to the alternative method of reasoning which we shall discuss in a moment, is merely silly. The two methods are complementary, and the whole effort of induction is to establish a general or universal judgment from which other judgments may safely be deduced.

The second method of reasoning is called deduction, a name which comes from the Latin de-ductus or “led from,” “drawn from.” Deduction works on the principle or guiding truth that, “What is true or false of a whole class is true or false of the members of the class.” An example of deduction is the follow-ins’:

All the known metals are heavier than water;

Zinc is a known metal;

Therefore, zinc is heavier than water.

A useful illustration of induction and deduction may be found in the plan of a textbook, say a Latin grammar. If the grammarian proposes general rules to be applied in individual instances, his method is deductive. He will say: “All nouns of the second declension ending in -um are neuter.” Thus he proposes a general law or truth, from which the student deduces conclusions about particular data, in this fashion:

All second declension nouns in -um are neuter;

Donum is a second declension noun in -um;

Therefore, donum is neuter.

But if the grammarian “leads on” or “leads in” the student to the formation of general rules by repeated instances, his method is inductive. He will not first formulate and set out a general rule, but will indicate the gender of each of a list of nouns in -um until the student is led to associate the ending with the gender and to reach the conclusion that all nouns in -um are neuter. The grammarian may set out some such list as this: donum, bellum, collum, signum, vinum, ferrum, folium, oppidum, damnum, auxilium, aurum, and indicate each as a neuter noun. The observant student cannot fail to notice the identity of endings and to associate this with the identity of gender in each case. He is led on (“induced”) to make the general rule for himself: Nouns of the second declension in -urn are neuter nouns. Notice here that the whole drive of induction is to set up a universal or general truth. And for what purpose? Surely that henceforth individual instances or data may be identified by application of that general truth; in a word, that conclusions may be deduced from it. Thus we see that induction and deduction are not opposed methods, but complementary methods. We see also that deduction is the major method, for induction is subordinated to it, and seeks to build up means for it. Hence to scoff at deduction (or the deductive method) and to cry up induction (or the inductive method) as the only valuable method of reasoning, is to be guilty of absurdity. It is true that for the incomplete sciences which depend upon detailed investigation of individual data, induction is the only method available, and it is a splendid and valid method of reasoning. But the point we make here is that induction leads to the knowledge of general or universal truths which are henceforth to be applied as the source of deduction. The point is that the methods are not opposed, but complementary. The general or universal truths which are the starting-points or founts of deduction are learned, in human science and philosophy, partly by induction, and partly by the simple act of intelligence recognizing self-evident truths.

b) Object of the Intellect

The object of a knowing-faculty is, as we have many times noticed, the reality which the faculty is fitted to recognize and know. The object of a sense is that which the sense is framed to perceive. The object of the intellect is that which the intellect is made to understand’■> or know in a manner consistent with its own nature as a cognitive faculty.

The object of a sense is called a sensile object; the object of the intellect is called an understandable or an intelligible object.

In its widest scope, the object of a knowing-faculty is called its adequate object. The adequate object of the intellect is everything understandable. Now, the adequate object of a faculty may be viewed in two ways: as ready to hand, and as blocked off by intervening forces or by the weakness of the faculty itself. Thus the adequate object of sight is everything visible. But many things are visible which sight cannot, as a fact, behold. The moons of Jupiter are visible, but one cannot see them with the naked eye. The bacteria in a glass of water are visible, but one cannot see them without a microscope. Now, that part of the adequate object which is, so to speak, ready to hand; that which the unaided faculty can, as a fact, lay hold of, is called the proportionate object of the faculty. The other part of the adequate object, which may, through special aid, be brought into the reach of the faculty, is called the extended object of the faculty in question.

Even in dealing with its proportionate object, a faculty may sometimes be forced to work through something else as a medium. Thus to see the size of a body (and size is per se visible) the body must have color. One cannot compute the size or volume of a stream of natural gas by the sense of sight. Thus, though size is visible per se, it is not visible per se primo, “of itself and primarily?’ Only colored surface is visible per se primo. Now, the object which is achievable per se primo by a knowing-faculty, is the proper object of that faculty. This object is often spoken of by philosophers and psychologists as the primary object, the immediate object, the direct object. The object which is not per se primo, but per se secundarie (“of itself but secondarily”) achievable by a faculty, is called the mediate, secondary, indirect object.

Here we ask: What is the adequate object of the intellect? What is the proper object? What is the indirect object?

i. The adequate object of the intellect is everything that has the character of being, of entity, of thing-ness. We cannot think of anything except as a thing. Even when we know that what we think of has no real entity (such as blindness, darkness, vacuity,—for these are not realities but the absence of realities) we must clothe the object with a kind of entity or being and consider it as though it were a reality. Otherwise we could not think of it at all. Things that have or can have real being, independently of our knowing them, are real entities; things (like darkness; square circle) which have no entity but that which our mind confers on them by considering them as though they were real, are rational entities or logical beings. Now, all being, all entity, all thing-ness, rational or real, comes together to make up the adequate object of intellect. In a word, the adequate object of the intellect is everything understandable, everything knowable, • everything intelligible, everything thinkable (and this includes, of course, everything imaginable).

When a being or entity is grasped by the intellect in such a way that the intellect truly knows it, the intellect possesses truth about it. Now, the whole purpose and effort of intellect in dealing with entity or being is to grasp truth. The adequate object of intellect is, therefore, accurately expressed as “the truth about everything intelligible.” More simply the adequate object of the intellect is truth or the true.

2. The proper object of the intellect in the present human status of a substantially united soul-and-body, is the essence of material things. This is the object which, in this earthly life, intellect seeks per se primo to know; this is the object about which intellect per se primo seeks truth. Man has immediate contact with the bodily world by his senses. The senses are the only immediate contacts with reality which a man pos sesses. The intellect cannot come at its object unless the senses function first and present their findings inwardly in the species or images of imagination. Now, the senses furnish only concrete and individual instances of knowledge about material things. The intellect, using the findings of sense re-present in imagination, arises, by its power of abstraction, to the knowledge of the essences of sense-objects (i. e., material things), and knows these essences, not primarily in individual, but in universal. This activity of intellect we have studied and amply illustrated in our discussion of the operation of the intellect, and, in special, in the discussion of simple apprehending. The intellect, then, has as its proper object (in the present state of man, in man’s earthly existence) the essences of material things conceived in universal.

We see how the intellect rises from sense data to the purely intelligible. In this life, the service of the senses is naturally indispensable. Sense must function first or intellect remains inoperative. In all its ideas, the intellect takes some beginning from sensation, from the grasp of material things. Therefore, we repeat, the per se primo or proper object of intellect is, in this life, the essence of material things, the essential truth about material things.

The intellect could come directly at supra-sensile truth were it not limited, as it is in man’s earthly state, to a beginning in sensed reality. We have seen that the intellect is a spiritual faculty, a supra-organic faculty, and therefore in itself it bears no limitation which requires it to begin with material essences. Hence we are justified in concluding that the soul, separated from its body by death, can directly lay hold of supra-sensile reality. But in this life; the proper object of intellect is the essences of material things grasped in universal.

5. The secondary or indirect object of intellect is that which it attains through its proper object. From the understanding of the essences of material things, the intellect arises to the knowledge of supra-sensile things, such as spirit, soul, God; such as unity, goodness, truth, beauty. Further, in the intellectual grasp of individual reality, even material reality, the intellect operates indirectly. To illustrate this last point: The eye lights upon a tree. The tree is sensed as an individual thing. But the intellect (which heretofore has not known tree) arises by abstraction to the knowledge of what a tree is. The intellect per se primo grasps the essence tree in universal, as tree as such. Only by a kind of reflection, or turning back upon its first operation, is the intellect aware of this tree as an individual reality of a certain essential kind. Thus the secondary or indirect object of the intellect may be expressed as the essence of supra-sensile realities in universal and in individual, and also the essence of material reality in individual.

4. An important item in the indirect object of the intellect is the soul and its faculties. The soul, by the faculty of intellect, knows itself, its faculties, its operations. By reflex advertence to its acts, the soul is made aware of the distinction between itself, its operations, and the faculties or capacities from which these operations proceed. The soul thus becomes reflexly conscious or intellectually conscious of itself, its operations, and its faculties of knowing and willing. We have seen that intellect, in this reflex service, is called intellectual consciousness.

Summary of the Article

In this Article we have learned the three operations of the intellect, viz., simple apprehending, judging, reasoning. We have studied the processes of these operations. We have determined the adequate, the proper, and the indirect object of intellect. We may now sum up the activity called intellection by reviewing the following points:

1. Intellection (i. e., the operation of intellect in simple apprehending) presupposes sensation, both exterior and interior, by which sensile objects are perceived and their images or sensile species are received in imagination for keeping and reproducing.

2. The intellectus agens illumines the imagination-images, abstracting or drawing out the essence from the individuating marks and material conditions that clothe it as an individual reality. This drawing out of the essence is, of course, making understandable what is in itself sensile. That which is capable of being sensed, and so taken in in image or in species by a sense, is now capable of being taken in in species or in image or in representation by the intellect. In a word, the intellectus agens, by the operation of abstraction, renders a sensile species intelligible.

3. The intellectus possibilis receives the intelligible species produced by the intellectus agens.

4. The intellectus possibilis reacts to the impressed species, possesses it, unites it to itself as a form, understands it and expresses it within itself as the expressed species or idea. The idea is the representation (species) of the essence of an object in the intellectus possibilis. The idea is also called a concept.

5. Turning upon its concepts by reflection, and so analyzing, comparing, uniting them, the intellect notices their constitution and their relations, and is thus enabled to form new concepts, even concepts of supra-sensile reality.

6. Intellection (the operation of intellect in simple apprehending) may be defined as a vital operation by which the intellect, impressed by an intelligible object, receives and expresses in itself the form or understood essence of the object as a thing known.