Glenn, Criteriology, 1937
Epistemology
Can the human mind reach truth? The certitude of knowledge, the refutation of scepticism, the criteria of true judgement.
Glenn, Criteriology
30 articlesIntroduction
Name, definition, object, importance, and division of Criteriology as the philosophical science of true and certain knowledge.
Knowledge
Chapter 1 Knowledge in General
Art. 1 Art. 2 Art. 3
Knowledge and Its Elements
The nature of knowledge, its essential elements — the knowing subject, the known object, and the cognitive act — and the problem of objectivity.
The Process of Knowing
How knowledge is acquired: the role of sensation, abstraction, and judgment in the knowing process.
The Trans-subjectivity of the Object of Knowledge
Whether the objects of knowledge are genuinely extra-mental realities or merely subjective constructs; the case for realism.
Chapter 2 Sense-Knowledge
Art. 1 Art. 2 Art. 3
Sense and Its Function
The nature of the senses, their faculties and organs, and their role as the foundation of all human knowledge.
Knowledge of the External Senses
The five external senses and their proper and common sensibles; the reliability of external sense-perception.
Knowledge of the Internal Senses
The internal senses — common sense, imagination, memory, and the cogitative power — and their contribution to knowledge.
Chapter 3 Intellectual Knowledge
Truth
Chapter 1 The Nature of Truth
Chapter 2 States of Mind with Reference to Truth
Chapter 3 The Criterion of Truth
Art. 1 Art. 2
The True Criterion
Evidence as the true and ultimate criterion of truth; the role of self-evident first principles and the conditions of valid evidence.
Inadequate Criteria
Critique of inadequate proposed criteria of truth: common consent, utility, feeling, and the authority of the individual.
Certitude
Chapter 1 The Nature of Certitude
Art. 1 Art. 2
Definition and Classification of Certitude
Certitude defined as a firm assent to truth without fear of error; its classification into metaphysical, physical, and moral certitude.
Degrees of Certitude
The gradations of certitude and probability; how degrees of assent correspond to the strength of the evidence.
Chapter 2 The Existence of Certitude
Art. 1 Art. 2 Art. 3 Art. 4
Dogmatism
Dogmatism as the correct position that certain knowledge is attainable; its defense against all forms of scepticism.
Skepticism
Universal scepticism — the claim that certain knowledge is impossible — its forms, historical exponents, and refutation.
Agnosticism
Agnosticism as the denial of knowledge beyond phenomena; its relationship to Kantian criticism and its philosophical refutation.
Relativism
Relativism as the view that truth and certitude are relative to the knower; its forms including pragmatism, and its refutation.
Chapter 3 The Certitude of Sense-Knowledge
Art. 1 Art. 2
The Validity of External Sense-Knowledge
Defense of the trustworthiness of external sensation against sceptical and idealist objections; the scholastic theory of perception.
The Validity of Internal Sense-Knowledge
The reliability of internal sense-perception — consciousness, memory, imagination — and its indispensability to intellectual knowledge.
Chapter 4 The Certitude of Intellectual Knowledge
Art. 1 Art. 2 Art. 3
The Objectivity of Ideas
Whether universal ideas genuinely represent objective reality; nominalism, conceptualism, and moderate realism assessed.
The Validity of Judgments
The trustworthiness of intellectual judgment, especially the self-evident first principles of reason and their indemonstrability.
The Validity of Reasoning
The reliability of the syllogism and mediate inference as instruments for extending certain knowledge.
Chapter 5 The Certitude of Faith
Art. 1 Art. 2 Art. 3
Authority in General
Authority as a source of certitude; the conditions under which testimony and expert witness generate genuine knowledge.
Divine Authority
Divine faith as the highest certitude; the grounds for assenting to divine revelation and its relation to natural reason.
Human Authority
Human testimony and tradition as sources of certitude; the limits of human authority and the conditions for prudent credence.