Causes and Causality in General

Chapter II — Beings in Their Causes

Article 1. Causes and Causality in General

The most important of relations is that of causality, that is, of the dependency of an effect upon its cause and of the necessity for finding adequate cause for existing effect. The recognition of this relation is a basic and indispensable requirement of reason in its work of interpreting the universe. Indeed, the principle of causality ranks close in importance to the first principles which are immediately derived from the concept of being. Philosophy, the highest achievement of unaided reason, is often described as “the science of ultimate causes?’ Rerum cognoscere causas, to learn the causes of things; that is the function of the philosopher. For the philosopher seeks knowledge that is root-deep, and he wants the deepest roots. Therefore the study of ultimate causes is his proper employment; when he knows things in their ultimate causes, he comes close to knowing all that is knowable about them. It is pur duty, therefore, in this treatise on ontology, which is the very heart of philosophy, to devote special study to the question of causes; We cannot know being thoroughly, unless we view beings in their causes. In the present Chapter we seek to discharge this duty. The Chapter is divided into three Articles,, as follows:

c) Classification of Causes

a) Meaning of Principle

We must define principle before we define cause, for cause stands to principle as species to genus, that is, a cause is a special kind of principle. Now a principle, in its widest meaning, is defined as that from which anything proceeds or takes its rise in any manner whatever.

There are many types of principles, but every one of them comes under the definition just given. There are, for example, intellectual and moral principles, that is, basic truths which serve to guide the mind to further knowledge, or the will to action. The axioms of geometry, for instance, are principles; in their guiding light the mathematician proceeds as he develops the whole of his science. The Ten Commandments are moral principles; they give directions which serve as the starting-point and the source of proper conduct. Every science, every art, every practical system of action, has its principles. The lad in manual training class learns the principles of carpentry, or of some other mechanical art; the law student learns the principles of jurisprudence; the medical student learns the principles of anatomy and therapeutics; even the little girl, learning to sew under the patient direction of a devoted mother, is learning principles, that is to say, first facts and truths which are valuable not only in themselves but as steps to further knowledge and skill. All conduct comes from moral principles, good or bad. Of a man whose conduct is upright and admirable we say, “He is a man of principle,” meaning, “His principles are good”; we rightly judge that his conduct comes from (proceeds from; takes its rise in) fixed convictions recognized as basic truths about what human conduct should be. Of the man whose conduct is evil, who is untrustworthy, we say, “He has no principle,” meaning, “His principles are not good,” “His conduct flows from (proceeds from; takes its rise in) convictions that are ignoble and unworthy.” In all this we see the justice of our definition of principle: that from which anything proceeds or takes its rise in any manner whatever.

In a material and literal way, a principle is simply a beginning, a starting-point, or a source. Thus the dawn is the principle (that is, the beginning) of the day; thus the mountain spring is the principle (that is, the source) of the dashing stream.

An important point,—indeed, the important point, as is manifest from the definition,—about a principle, is that it is prior, or has priority, to what proceeds from it. There are various types of priority, among which the following are important: (a) Priority of order; the point is prior to the line, and is the principle of the line, (d) Priority of time,—called also priority of succession; dawn is prior to day; three O’clock is prior to four o’clock, (c) Priority of nature; the flame is prior to the illumination that comes from it, even though it is not prior in time. Flame and illumination come into existence at the same instant (although, of course, it takes time for the illumination to spread abroad), (d) Priority of consequence; the working out of a theorem is prior to the proved conclusion; the conclusion proceeds from the demonstration and is its consequence.

A principle, then, in widest sense, is that from which anything proceeds, whether it has being therefrom, or is made thereof, or is known thereby. In a stricter sense, a principle is an entity (real or logical) which is distinct from, and prior to, and intimately connected witlt, that which proceeds from it.

b) Meaning of Cause

A cause; as we have said, is a special kind of principle. It is a principle by force of which a thing is produced. Whatever contributes, in any manner, to the producing of a thing, is a cause. We notice at once that a cause is always a principle; we must notice also that a principle in not always a cause. The point is the principle of the line, but not its cause, unless in the special view of a line as produced by the transit of a point through space. The dawn is the principle of day, but not its cause. The starting-point is the principle of a race, but not the cause of the race. In other words, the idea of principle is generic and includes cause as a species; but principle has non-cause as its species too. Particular points of difference between the wider concept (principle) and the narrower or more special {cause) are these: (a) Between a cause and what proceeds from it (effect) there must be a real distinction, whereas there is sometimes only a logical distinction between a principle and what proceeds from it. (b) Between a cause and its effect, there is an order of dependency; that is, effect depends on cause; such dependency is not always present in the case of what proceeds from a principle. When the lights are “dimmed out” in a theatre, the darkness follows upon, or proceeds from, the gradual fading of the illumination; but the darkness does not depend upon such gradual fading; it might have come suddenly by the simple snapping off of the electric current, (c) A cause is prior to its effect by a real priority, at least of nature if not of time. But a principle is often only logically prior to what proceeds from it. Thus the Divine Essence is the principle pf the Divine Attributes, but is only logically prior to them (that is, prior in a special view of mind, since Essence and Attributes are really identified).

A cause must be carefully distinguish from a reason, from an occasion, and from a condition.

i, A reason is that which, in any manner, contributes to the explanation or the understanding of a thing. Smoke informs me that there is fire; it explains or makes me understand the presence of fire; but it is not the cause of fire. Everything (finite and infinite, substantial and accidental) has its reason, but not everything has its cause. Infinite Being is uncaused; but it is not unknown or unexplained. Therefore, we have an important self-evident truth (called the principle of sufficient reason) which may be stated thus: nothing exists without a sufficient reason for its existing. But the principle of causality runs: nothing is produced without a cause (or sum of causes) adequate to produce it. Contrast the terms, exists and is produced. The existence of a thing demands an explanation, and this explanation (that is, this reason) is found either in the existing thing itself (and then it is uncaused, necessary, self-existent, infinite), or in something other than the existing thing (that is, in its causes). Here once more we see an important contrast, and we declare: every cause is a reason, but not every reason is a cause. In other words, when you know what causes a thing, you know something which explains the thing, at least in some measure; but you may know something about a reality without knowing what caused it, and you may know something about that Reality which has no causes because it is unproduced.

2. An occasion is that in the presence of which, or on the occurrence of which, something is done. Thus, an anti-New Dealer may find the picture of the President in his morning paper the occasion for unpleasant thoughts and, perhaps, unpleasant language. The picture is not the cause of the unpleasantness; it is the occasion. Every occasion has something of the character of a reason; but not every reason is an occasion. Men are morally bound to avoid the occasions of sin. The occasions of sin, however, are not the causes of sin, for the cause of sin is the will of the sinnef.

3. A condition is that which is required (by nature, by agreement, or by bias of mind) before a thing is done. A condition is more or less readily dispensable. If it is indispensable it is called a conditio sine qua non, that is, “a condition without the fulfillment of which (a certain thing) will not (be done)”; in other words, it is a necessary condition. You may agree to buy an article if the merchant will reduce his price; you place a condition. The actual causes of the transaction (if it comes off) are the wills of buyer and seller. Hence the condition referred to is not the cause of the sale. The fulfillment of the condition may indeed be a reason for buying, and the condition itself may be a reason for the merchant to reduce the price of the article. Usually a condition bears the character, directly or indirectly, of a reason; but not every reason is a condition. To illustrate further: The physician may say, “You’ll not get well unless you take this medicine”; he expresses a condition, and indeed an indispensable condition. If you take the medicine, and its cures you, the medicine is the cause of your cure (one among several causes which include your will to take the medicine, the fact that the druggist is able to compound it, and so on); the medicine, duly taken and effective, explains your cure and is therefore a reason for your cure; and the taking of the medicine, regarded abstractly, is the condition of your cure. Here we see how cause, reason, and condition may concur or even overlap without, however, becoming identified.

A cause, to repeat, is that which contributes, in any manner whatever, to the producing of a thing. Stress the word producing, A cause looks to products. And the thing produced by a cause is called its effect. Between cause and effect exists the relation called causality. For true causality to exist there must be: a real distinction between cause and effect; a true dependence of effect upon cause; a priority of time or of nature in the cause when viewed in conjunction with its effect.

c) Classification of Causes

We here present Aristotle’s catalogue of ultimate causes. We shall list the four major causes, and we shall mention certain minor causes. But before taking up the definition of these causes, we shall consider them as presented in a concrete example.

I have here before me an ivory crucifix. It is not a necessary thing (it is not a thing that has to exist, it has had existence given to it); it is a contingent thing, as all finite realities are. It is contingent upon, or dependent upon, the causes that produced it. For it is a produced reality; it is an effect. Let us see what a study of this crucifix has to tell us about its causes.

First of all, I notice that this crucifix is made of a substance called ivory. This substance has made a contribution to the effect (that is, to the crucifix), for without it the crucifix would not be here. Of course, some other substance might have been used, wood, or metal, or rubber, or plaster, or other material. But, in that case, the effect (this crucifix) would not have been precisely this effect that it is now; it might be an effect very smiliar to this, but the point is it would not have been exactly this thing that it is now. Well, the material out of which this bodily object is made is its material cause. The material cause has place in every substantial bodily effect. Spiritual creatures have their causes, but they have no material cause, since there is no bodiliness about them; there is no material out of which they are made. The material cause is called an internal or an intrinsic cause, since it is right in the effect, it is part and parcel with the effect; thus the bit of ivory which is here shaped into a crucifix is right in the product itself; it is internal or intrinsic to it. The first of the four major causes is called the material cause.

Secondly, I notice that the crucifix has been given a definite form or shape or image-value. This is a cause, for if the bit of ivory had been differently shaped it would not be a crucifix, or at least, not the precise crucifix it is now. Remember that a cause is what contributes in any manner to the being and the producing of the effect; and surely the outer form of this crucifix has a lot to do with its being just what it is. Yet the outer form, the shape, the image, of the crucifix is an accidental thing, not substantial. The substance of which the crucifix is made would be this same substance if it were differently carved or shaped. But, as a fact, it is this determinate kind of substance that makes the crucifix, and no other; there is a substantial determinant (that is, form) of this effect as well as an accidental one; and any determinant of an effect has the character of cause. Therefore, in this crucifix, we notice an accidental formal cause (which gives it its shape, image-value); and we notice a substantial formal cause (which makes it a reality in this substance, and no other). We must not confuse the material cause with the substantial formal cause in studying this crucifix as an effect. The material cause is ivory, taken as a finished product, a completed thing, without reference to anything further. The substantial formal cause is that which makes ivory what it is, namely, ivory and not some other substance. And we must notice that there are several accidental determinants about the crucifix as an effect: it has not only a certain shape or image-value; it has also a certain size, a certain weight, a certain color, and so on, and all these points are determinations (that is, determinate facts; things which set or determine reality) of the crucifix; and if any one of them were different, the crucifix itself would be so far different. So the crucifix is actually determined in its being as an effect by all of these accidental items or points of reality; each of them makes a contribution, however slight, to what the crucifix actually is. Therefore, each of these determinants is an accidental formal cause of the crucifix. Here we have discerned the formal cause, which is of two kinds, viz., substantial and accidental. The formal cause is part and parcel with the effect; it is right in the effect. That which makes ivory ivory is right here in the ivory crucifix and is the substantial formal cause of the crucifix; and that which makes this crucifix an image with this outline, this weight, this size, this color, etc., is, in each case, something that affects the crucifix in itself, in its real being and existence. Therefore, the formal cause, like the material cause, is internal or intrinsic.

Thirdly, I am well aware that this crucifix had a maker. Someone carved the bit of ivory into this particular form. Manifestly, this someone has made a notable contribution to the production of this effect, for without his activity the effect would not have been produced. The maker of a thing, the being by whose physical activity the thing is produced, is the efficient cause of the effect. This is the third in the list of major causes. And here we must notice two minor causes, (a) The artist (the efficient cause) who made this crucifix had in mind an image of the crucifix as he worked, and, indeed, before he started to make this crucifix. Perhaps he had another crucifix which he used as a pattern; perhaps he had a painting of the Crucifixion which served him as a model. But whether the image was in his mind (or, more accurately, in his imagination), or was another crucifix, or a painting, it is certain that he had some model, some pattern, some exemplar. And this model or exemplar guided his activity in carving the crucifix, and thus made its contribution to the effect; it is therefore to be reckoned among the true causes of this effect. We call this cause an exemplar-cause, that is, a pattern-cause, a model-cause. It is a minor cause, for it subserves the action of the efficient cause which is a major cause. (b) The artist (efficient cause) who made this crucifix did not make it by a mere act of mind and will. Since he is finite, he is not one who has but to know and to will a thing, and it is there. He has to use things, and, by effort or labor or physical action, to make them into something else (substantially or accidentally). Therefore, the artist who made this crucifix had to use hands and tools in order to produce it. His efficient activity would have been baulked and rendered null if he had not the requisite instruments for producing this effect. The tools that served the artist are instrumental causes of the crucifix; so too are those instruments which are naturally conjoined with the artist, his hands and his eyes and his steady nerves. These latter are natural instruments or instrumental causes; the tools are artificial or mechanical instruments or instrumental causes. The instrumental cause is a minor cause, subserving as it does the action of the major efficient cause.—The efficient cause is external to the effect; for manifestly, the man who made this crucifix is not part and parcel with the substance or the accidents of the crucifix itself; he is not in the crucifix. Hence the efficient cause is listed as an external or an extrinsic cause.

Fourthly, I realize from my consideration of this crucifix as an effect that the maker (the efficient cause) did not produce it aimlessly or without any reason whatever. There must have been something that served him as a reason, a goal, a purpose, an end-in-view, as he set about the work of making this crucifix. Perhaps he wished to express devotion; perhaps he wished to practise his art; perhaps he had an order for this crucifix and wanted the money he would receive for it; perhaps he had time on his hands and wished to be doing something to make it pass quickly; perhaps he thought that an ivory crucifix would be “a nice thing to have.” At all events, there was certainly something that accounts for the activity of the efficient cause in making this crucifix, and so accounts for the crucifix itself, that is, accounts for its producing, for its being here. Now, the reason, the end-in-view, the purpose, the aim, the goal, which the efficient cause has in producing the effect is called the final cause of the efficient activity and of the effect itself. The term comes from the Latin finis “end” (or, more precisely, from the adjective-form of that noun, finalis “having reference or relation to an end”); the term “end” here means “end-in-view”; it means purpose; it means reason for acting. If the efficient cause is a creature, that is, a finite cause, the final cause is usually to be described as his motive, that is, the thing that moves him to exercise his efficient activity. But when we speak of God, the First Efficient Cause of all things, we must never speak of His motive, for God is not moved to produce an effect; God ever acts with the fullest, freest, most uninfluenced choice. Still, God, as Efficient Cause, has ever a reason and a purpose in His eternally decreed efficient activity; for God is Supreme Intelligence and Infinite Wisdom, and it is not wise in an intelligent being to act without reason or purpose. Therefore, the final cause is always an end-in-view, a reason, and a purpose; for creatures, it is usually a motive as well. In passing, to complete our comment on Divine Activity, we should notice that God is the First Efficient Cause of all things, and He is also their ultimate reason or purpose, for all creatures are made to manifest the objective and (in case of rational creatures) the formal glory of God. Hence it is correct to say: God is the First Efficient Cause and the Ultimate Final Cause of all things. A further fact to notice: the final cause is not a minor, but a major cause. It does not merely subserve the action of the efficient cause; it tends to produce the effect through the activity of the efficient cause; it does not merely guide the efficient cause in its action as the exemplar-cause does, or make action physically possible as the instrumental cause does, but it accounts for the whole action, and the effect of the whole action, by its worth or value as a sufficient reason for the action. It is manifest that the final cause is, in creatures, an extrinsic cause. The ivory crucifix has in itself the material of which it is made (with its formally substantial character) and it has the precise accidental forms or determinants which make it just what it is in every way. But the purpose of the artist is not part and parcel with the crucifix; you cannot know for certain, from an examination of the crucifix itself, just what the final cause of the artist was.

We may sum up the results of our study of the crucifix as an effect by setting forth the following schema of causes:

{f<Sl. (Substantial

CAUSE

Intrinsic — Material; Formal — Substantial, Accidental

Extrinsic — Efficient (subserved by exemplar, instrumental); Final

Summary of the Article

This Article has shown us the meaning of principle, and has given us detailed knowledge of the requirement of priority which belongs to a principle. It has shown us various types of principle. Among these types we distinguished one which stands to principle as species to genus, and this is cause. We have defined cause, and have seen wherein it is distinguished from reason, occasion, and condition. We have learned that causality is the relation existing between cause and effect. We have classified causes according to Aristotle’s list of four major causes, viz., material, formal, efficient, final. We have considered certain minor causes. We have seen that the major causes themselves fall into two classes, viz., intrinsic and extrinsic causes.

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