The Great Question of Philosophy in the Middle Ages

Chapter I — The Preparation for Scholastic Philosophy

Article 1. The Great Question of Philosophy in the Middle Ages

Even during the Golden Age of the Roman Empire barbarian hordes had made incursions into western Europe and had been thrust back again and again by the imperial cohorts. But Rome weakened and fell; the barbarian inroads continued. Successful at last, the savages spread through Europe, and as early as the 5 century Italy itself was under their control. All institutions of civilization and culture failed in this crisis —all but one. The Church of Jesus Christ endured when the greatest and most powerful of the works of man were laid in ruins. True to her divine mission, the Church set to work to convert the barbarians. She sent out missionaries; she founded monasteries; she opened schools. In time her labors bore fruit, and in the 8 century the new Europeans had been brought into some semblance of civilization and spiritual culture: the Church had taught them priceless lessons; they had come to know something of their dignity, their destiny, and the necessity of living virtuously for supernatural motives. Only when this work had been done could the Church implant and foster in the minds of her new and warlike children that love of learning which has always been the mark of her influence.

Before the end of the 8 century the Church had set on foot a strong tendency in the direction of education. The influence of the monastery schools began to be generally felt. Kings, fired by zeal for learning, favored the new movement. None was more earnest among the royal patrons of learning than the first monarch of his time, Charlemagne, King of the Franks. This great ruler labored as tirelessly for the welfare of his subjects as for the extension of his kingdom, and his efforts for the revival of learning were earnest and persevering. There had been a school at the palace of the Frankish kings from the days of the Merovingians, but it was an aristocratic institution, meant to prepare for Church and State the scions of leading families. This was the so-called Palatine or Palace School. Charlemagne made this institution the centre of the new learning. He imported teachers from the north (England and Ireland), where the lamp of learning had continued to glow during the days of the prostration of Europe; he collected the relics of classical literature, Christian and pagan; he collaborated with Alcuin, chief master of his School, in securing the cooperation of abbots and bishops everywhere throughout his realm in the work of establishing schools. It is to this new movement for education, this “Revival of Learning” of the 8 century, that we must trace the very earliest beginnings of Scholastic Philosophy.

In medieval language the word “scholastic” meant any scholar of recognized ability, but the word was used in a special way to designate the head of a school. Now the heads of medieval schools were generally men who had not only mastered the seven liberal arts (i. e., the trivium: grammar, rhetoric, dialectic; and the quadrivium: arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music), but were versed also in philosophy and theology. As the name of a special system of philosophy, “Scholastic” designates that system of doctrine which originated in the Schools during the Revival of Learning and reached perfection with St. Thomas Aquinas in the 13 century. Its characteristic marks are two: first, it is thoroughly rational in method, using the light of reason alone for the investigation of truth. In this it follows the best of the philosophies of antiquity, the Greek, and the best of the Greek philosophies, the Aristotelean. Its second characteristic mark is that it uses Christian Faith or Revelation as a directive norm. Revelation is not used as a source of argument, but only as a test of conclusions. Since Faith is certain, and known with absolute security as the truth, it can be used as a criterion or test; and the philosopher can use its light as a guide in the fields of research. As the light of strong lamps guides the motorist, but turns no wheels, so Revelation illumines the way of the Scholastic Philosopher, but does not serve him as a font of argument or proof. And the philosopher, be it noted, is like the motorist also in this: that he courts disaster if he moves forward without light upon his path.

Now, before taking up the beginnings of Scholasticism, it will be well to make a preliminary study of the great question that, directly or indirectly, engaged the best efforts of even the earliest Scholastics,—the question of Universal Ideas, or simply “Universals,” as they are called. After discussing this question, the student can go on intelligently to trace out the course of Scholasticism, its rise, development, perfection, decline. Therefore the present Chapter is divided into the following three articles:

in the Middle Ages

The most important, though by no means the only question that engaged the minds of medieval philosophers was the question of Universals. The famous controversy in this matter did not appear in full flare until the 11 century, but the earliest Scholastics touched the question at least indirectly. It seems best, therefore, to give some account of Universals before taking up the beginnings of Medieval Philosophy.

The student of the History of Philosophy must be able to answer the following questions:

i. What is meant by Universals?

ii. What doctrines on Universals are possible?

hi. Why is the question of Universals important?

iv. What made this question so prominent in the Middle

Ages?

i. What is meant by Universals?

A Universal means the object of a universal idea or concept. I have, for example, a universal idea of man, i. e., human being. This is a representation in my intellect. It is the representation of an essence. This essence is found verified in each and every individual human being that exists, has existed, will exist, or could exist. The differences which distinguish one human individual from another—differences of age, sex, size, color, nationality,, etc.—have no part in the essential representation in the intellect which is called a universal idea: such differences are not essential but accidental. Hence the baby, the adult, the male, the female, the scholar, the dullard, the sane, the insane, the saint, the sinner, the Negro, the Mongol, the Indian, the Caucasian, the normal man, the misshapen and deformed —in a word, each and every human being, past, present, and to come, and each and every human that can be even imagined as existing, squares precisely with my universal idea man. Each is conceived as a man, as a human being. No matter how individual men may differ, each must be conceived as having the same essence. My universal idea man represents that essence.

Now an idea is called universal because it can represent each and every member of a class universally, without exception. The universal idea (or, as it is usually called, simply the Universal) is a single representation in the intellect which can represent many in an essential manner. The many which the Universal can represent are called the inferiors of the Universal and make up what is called the extension or denotation of the Universal. If the Universal represents its inferiors completely, it is called the Species of its inferiors. If the Universal represents only an essential part which its inferiors have in common, though they differ essentially in other points, it is called the Genus of its inferiors. Thus the Universal man is the Species of its inferiors, and these are individuals, not being distinguishable into further Species. Thus the Universal animal is the Genus of its inferiors, since it represents brutes and men according to a common part of their essence, though brutes and men also differ essentially. A Universal is said to be predicated of its inferiors by the judgment of the intellect. For a fuller account of predictability consult the article on Aristotle’s Dialectic.

The Universal, then, is a representation in intellect of an essence which is predictable of many (individuals or species). The chief Universals are Genera and Species. Now the question is: what are these Genera and Species? Are they things? Or, more precisely, do Universals (Genera and Species) represent things as they are outside the mind? What in the order of extramental reality corresponds to Universals? These questions the great medieval philosophers sought to answer.

ii. What Doctrines are Possible in the Matter of Universals?

Are Genera and Species things? What corresponds to these Universals in the order of reality outside the mind? There are four answers possible, and only four; and only one of the four can be the true answer. Thus there are four possible doctrines in the matter of Universals. These are:

(i) Exaggerated Realism (called also Extreme Realism or Ultra-Realism). In the world of extramental reality there exist universal essences. These are represented by Universals. Thqs there is a universal human essence, a universal essence man. Human individuals merely participate this universal essence. Some Ultra-Realists say that each human individual possesses the whole human essence. To the question, therefore,. “Are Universals (Genera and Species) things in the order of reality outside the mind?” the Ultra-Realist answers, “Yes.” Ultra-Realism is a false doctrine.

(2) Moderated Realism (called also Qualified Realism or Moderate Realism). Outside the mind there are no universal essences; there are only individual things. The individual things are conceived by the mind to be classes or groups of beings of the same essence, and the mind represents each group or class by the single representation of that essence. In other words, the mind can represent by a Universal that essence which is found in each of the members of a class or group. And when such classes or groups have essential points in common, though essentially distinguished by other points, the mind can represent by a further Universal a plurality of classes or groups by the single representation of the point or part of their essence which is common. Thus it is seen that the universality of the Universal comes from the mind, and is in the mind. But it is not a gratuitous contribution of the mind to the function of knowing. There is a reason, a foundation, a basis in extramental reality for the universality of the idea in the mind. This basis in reality for the mental universality of the idea (Universal) is seen in the fact that the Universal can be verified in each and every member of the class called its inferiors. Thus the idea (Universal) man is verified in every human individual, actual and possible, outside the mind. Thus the Universal circle is verified in each and every circle that can be conceived, or graphically represented outside the mind. In answer, therefore, to the question, “Are Universals (Genera and Species) things in the order of extramental reality?” the Moderate Realist answers: “No; but Universals have a basis in reality outside the mind, for they are verifiable in a multiplicity of things in the order of extramental reality.” Moderate Realism is the true doctrine in the matter of Universals.

(3) Conceptualism. Outside the mind there are no universal essences; there are only individual things. But the individual things are grouped by the mind, and each group is represented by a universal idea or concept. There is no essential basis in reality for such grouping. Such grouping is due to the mind’s mode of conceiving things, of forming concepts (ideas) of things. The mind may, indeed, use the mere relation of material resemblance in things as a basis for its grouping them and forming concepts or universal ideas of them; but such relation is accidental and not essential in the things so grouped. Therefore, to the question, “Are Universals (Genera and Species) things in the order of reality outside the mind?” the Conceptualist answers, “No; they are modes of the mind’s conceiving (concept forming), and are based on no essential reality outside the mind.” Conceptualism is a false doctrine.

(4) Nominalism. Outside the mind there are no universal essences; there are only individual things. But it is clearly impossible to have a separate idea or mental representation of each and every individual thing. Hence the mind arbitrarily groups individual things, and labels them, so to speak, with group names (i. e., mental names). Universals are merely mentally applied names, nothing more. Their value is wholly subjective; they represent nothing whatever in the objective groups of things for which they stand. Universals are a mere convenience —albeit a necessary one—for thinking out the world of reality in anything like an adequate or orderly fashion. And the name “universal” is itself a misnomer; for universals have no universality either in themselves as essential names (which they are not) or in reality. Therefore, to the question, “Are Universals (Genera and Species) things in the order of reality outside the mind?” the Nominalist answers, “No; nor are they really ‘universals’ at all; they are mere arbitrary group-names, nothing more.” Nominalism is false doctrine.

Notice in the above explanation of the different doctrines concerning Universals, the reason for the following dicta, which are often quoted as the respective summaries of the four doctrines: (1) Ultra-Realism is expressed in the saying, “Universalia ante rem” (Universals before the individual reality). That is, universal essences exist; they do not require that individual things participate them; they are prior to and independent’ of the individual things. Thus if there were no men, the universal essence man would still be a reality. Individual things come, in nature or in time or both, after the universal essence, and participate it. Therefore: Universals before the (individual) reality.

(2) Moderate Realism is expressed in the formula: “Universalia ante rem, post rem, et in re” (Universals before the reality, after the reality, in the reality). That is, Universals before the reality in the mind of God, who contains the exemplary causes of all things, knows them as they are essentially; after the reality in the mind of man, who forms Universals by abstraction of the intellect after sensation of extramental realities; in the reality, inasmuch as the essence represented in the mind by the Universal is found verified in each of its inferiors extramentally.

(3) Conceptualism is summed up thus: “Universalia post rem” (Universals after the reality). That is, the mind must know extramental realities first, and then it groups, or conceives, these in collections by reason of its own natural function.

(4) Nominalism is also expressed in the formula: “Universalia post rem,” for the mind, says the Nominalist, must first experience contact with individual things and then it groups them arbitrarily and gives the groups the mental name called a “Universal.”

The great controversy over the nature of Universals which was waged in the Middle Ages did not clearly define the camps of the Ultra-Realist, the Moderate Realist, the Conceptualist, and the Nominalist. The dispute was between the Ultra-Realists and the Anti-Realists. The Anti-Realists were sometimes Nominalists, sometimes Conceptualists, sometimes Moderate Realists.

Hi. Why is the Question of Universals Important?

This question is important because it touches the basis of all rational knowledge. If Nominalism or Conceptualism is true, then there can be no science. I cannot, for example, take up geometry and study “The Circle” unless I know essentially what “circle” is and must eternally remain. If “circle” is a mere arbitrary name, or if it merely expresses the mind’s mode of forming concepts of similar things, then I cannot know that “the circumference is equal to the diameter times 3.1416*” I might indeed discover the ratio of circumference and diameter in an individual circle, having found the matter true by experiment; but I could not—in the hypothesis of Nominalism or Conceptualism being true—declare the proposition true of all and any circles. To have a universal truth, there must be universal ideas which really represent changeless essences of things.

On the other hand, if Ultra-Realism be true, then I cannot rely upon my senses. My senses assure me of the existence of individual things in the extramental world, but not of universal things. And if the universal essences are there, and the senses cannot even remotely come at their presence, I must regard my sense-knowledge as inadequate, and I have some grounds for doubting its validity. Now, if my senses are not certainly reliable, I cannot reason reliably on sense findings. Thus the validity of thought itself is put in doubt. So, on speculative grounds, I find Ultra-Realism a doctrine that would destroy science and lead, if logically developed, to skepticism. The doctrine of Ultra-Realism is no less destructive on practical grounds. If there is a reality, universal in its nature, which corresponds to my universal idea, what am I to say of the reality corresponding to my universal idea “substance”? Clearly, I must assert the real existence of a universal substance. This can be no other than the necessary substance, or God, in last analysis. But this is pantheism, a doctrine subversive of all morality. Therefore, I must reject Ultra-Realism on both speculative and practical grounds.

These examples show only a small part of the far-reaching effects of the doctrine of Universals. Yet they are sufficient to indicate the importance of the question in philosophy. It is to be remarked here, however, that the early Scholastics did not discuss (nor perhaps realize) these ultimate consequences of the doctrines controverted.

iv. What Made the Question of Universals so Prominent in the

Middle Ages?

The question of Universals was discussed by the Greeks. It had its beginnings in pre-Socratic times, but Plato was the first to teach a definite doctrine in the matter. He professed Ultra-Realism of a special kind in his theory of Subsistent Real Ideas. Aristotle taught Moderate Realism. After Aristotle nearly all Schools dealt with the question, reaching one of the four possible conclusions outlined above. The Fathers scarcely touched the question; even St. Augustine did not take a definite stand, although he wrote much on the validity and objectivity of our knowledge. The Fathers, however, discussed theological questions, such as the Trinity and the Incarnation and the Real Presence. Such theological questions were taken by the Scholastics and studied in the light of philosophy, and these matters have a direct or indirect reference to the question of Universals. Thus the theological questions studied by the Fathers and handed down as the heritage of the new philosophers of the Revival of Learning introduced the matter of Universals to the Middle Ages. No clear line of demarcation had been drawn at this time between the field of theology and that of philosophy; and, indeed, more than one of the early Medieval philosophers taught that the truths of Revelation constitute the proper object of the philosopher’s study. Another reason for the prominence of the question of Universals in Medieval Philosophy is found in the fact that the early Schoolmen studied Aristotle’s Dialectic—wherein Universals are discussed —but did not possess his metaphysical works, and so lacked a thorough grasp of those principles (drawn chiefly from Cos-mology and Psychology) without which the matter of Universals cannot be perfectly understood. Hence the knowledge of Universals was incomplete and inadequate in the early Scholastics, and it was but natural that disagreements and controversy on the subject should occur.