Greco-Roman Philosophy
Roman Stoics and Epicureans, and Cicero's transmission of Greek philosophy to Rome.
This Chapter discusses the philosophy which the Romans adopted or adapted from the Greek systems. Although Italy and Sicily had been home to celebrated Greek philosophers as early as the sixth century B.C., the Romans themselves produced no original system, and their contribution lies rather in transmission and in the practical turn they gave to what they received. Glenn treats in order the Roman Stoics of note, the Roman Epicureans of importance, and Marcus Tullius Cicero. Cicero accepts the Platonic division of philosophy into Logic, Physics, and Ethics, and Glenn credits him above all with creating a Latin philosophical vocabulary and with preserving, in works largely compilatory, much Greek doctrine that would otherwise have been lost.
Chapter IV — Greco-Roman Philosophy
(iz century b. c. to 2 century after Christ)
This Chapter discusses the philosophy which the Romans adopted or adapted from the Greek systems. Although Italy and Sicily had been the home of celebrated Greek philosophers as early as the 6 century b. c., when Pythagoras settled at Cro-tona, the Romans had developed no philosophy of their own. And it was not until the 2 century b, c, that Greek philosophy achieved notable influence in Rome. Even then Rome did not accept the foreign intrusion without protest, for in 161 b. c. the Senate decreed that no philosopher or rhetorician should reside in Rome. The conquest of Greece, and the military expeditions of Caesar, Pompey, Antony, and Augustus widened the Roman contacts and made the people of the Capital more susceptible to the beauty and value of even foreign things. Then came the inflow of Greek learning and the establishment in the Eternal City of teachers of Greek philosophy.
The Romans were of practical mind. Statecraft and conquest and all the activity of the building of a great empire they could understand and appreciate. Even after they accepted philosophy, they asked of it no deep speculation, but practical rules of action. Thus such philosophical systems as developed among the Romans are largely ethical. It is, however, only fair to the Romans to notice that when Greek philosophy came to be an influence among them, it was already in its decline, and was engaged chiefly with questions of Ethics.
Some Roman Philosophers were mentioned in connection
with the Post-Aristotelean Schools discussed in the last Chapter, and their names may be repeated here. But, with the exception of Cicero, no Roman philosopher will be dealt with in any detail. For the others, it will suffice to notice the Greek School to which each belongs. The present Chapter will treat, therefore, of a) Roman Stoics: b) Roman Epicureans: c) Cicero, the Eclectic.
a) Roman Stoics of note were the following:
i. Marcus Annaeus Lucanus (Lucan) a. d. 39-65.
ii. Aulus Persius Flaccus (Persius) a. d. 34-62.
hi. Lucius Annaeus Cornutus (Cornutus) died a. d. 68. iv. Athenodorus of Tarsus, teacher of Augustus (1 century b. c.-i century after Christ).
v. Attains, teacher of Seneca (1 century b. c.-i century after Christ).
vi. Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Seneca), teacher of Nero, a. d. 1-65. Seneca wrote several treatises on Physics, twelve books of Dialogues, and 124 Letters to Lucilius. FUl is one of the most famous of Roman Stoics.
vii. Musonius Rufus (Musonius). Born a. d. 40.
viii. Epictetus, first a slave, then a freedman; “disciple of Musonius. About A. v. 50-138. There are extant four dissertations of his so-called ”Moral Theology.“ He, like Seneca, was a very famous Roman Stoic.
ix. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (Marcus Aurelius), Emperor of Rome, a. d. 121-180. He wrote a book To Himself, a meditative work, Christian rather than pagan in character. Some critics declare that the book is the work of some medieval Christian and is falsely ascribed to the Emperor-philosopher.
b) Roman Epicureans of importance were:
i. Titus Lucretius Cams (Lucretius), 05-51 b. c., whose noem De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things)
Ipuds Epicurus and his godless hedonism. Lucretius was
the first philosopher to propose a theory of ..atheistical
evQlutio. an explanation.Luni.vsL.
ii. Publius Ovidius Naso (Ovid), about zn b. c.-17 a. d.,
the poet famous for his Metamorphnses.
iij. Quintus Horatius Flaccus (Horace), 66-q b. c., the
still greater poet and author of the Canning and Satires
and The Art of Poesy, who confesses himself “Epicuri
de grege porcus“—a swine of Epicurus’ herd.
c) Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B- c.)
Life: Cicero was born at Arpinum in Latium. In his youth he went to Rome, where he studied philosophy under several famous masters, among whom was Philo of Larissa. He journeyed to Greece, and later to Asia. In Greece he studied under Antiochus, the Academian, and Possidonius, the Stoic. After his return to Rome he became a very prominent figure in public life. His political history is well known and needs no mention here. He met death in the year 43 b. c. at the command of Antony, whose tyranny he had freely criticized.
Works: Notable among the works of Cicero are: Libri Contra Academicos, or Books Against the Academians; De Natura Deorum, On the Nature of the Gods; De Divinatione, On Divination; De Fato, On Fate; Disputationes Tusculanae, Tusculanean Disputations; De Officiis, On Duties; De Legi-bus, On Laws; and De Republican On the State.
Doctrine: Cicero accepts the Platonic division of philosophy, viz., Logic, Physics, and Ethics.
In Logic, Cicero contents himself with the quest of a criterion or test of truth. He believes sensations valid; they move the senses and the mind so vividly that they can hardly be illusory; yet he says that the objective validity of sensations cannot be proved. Sensations, then, are not an absolutely certain test of truth. Following his quest for such a test, Cicero investigates the facts of consciousness or internal experience. Here he finds certain matters—such as the common principles of morality—made very plain to the mind; but the facts of consciousness, like those of sense, lack absolute proof. Cicero then studies the “general consent of mankind” as a criterion or test of truth, and, while he finds it of the greatest value as a practical norm, he concludes that it must be listed with sensation and consciousness as incapable of thorough-going proof. He concludes that the criteria discovered are quite sufficient for practical needs, but since they are not absolute, he aligns himself with the moderate Skeptics, and declares the possibility of attaining probability, but not perfect certainty.
In Physics, Cicero does not deal with bodily nature, but views the world in its relation to God and man. He declares that the contemplation of nature is food for the soul, even though one can only achieve probability about it as the richest fruit of study. He gives eloquent and cogent arguments for the existence of God. He declares that while we can know that God is, we cannot know what He is; in other words, that we can know the existence of God, but not His nature. Inconsistently, he describes with some accuracy the divine attributes. In point of God’s spirituality, Cicero’s doctrine is obscure. He teaches that God rules the world by His Providence, yet asserts that some things occur by pure chance; and these latter he excludes from the knowledge of God, saying that if God knew them, they would occur of necessity and not fortuitously. The human soul is from God; it is immortal; in the life to come it will have a more perfect existence than here on earth; it will never suffer pains. Cicero asserts free-will in man, but his arguments do not cover the whole field of the question; he is obviously moved to assert the freedom of the will because he is not prepared to accept the ill consequences that come of its denial. In all matters Cicero is careful to state that, however fully he is convinced of the truth of what he teaches, there is no absolute-p
In Ethics. Cicero distinguishes a twofold end to be achieved bv man, viz., happiness in this life and happiness hereafter. To gain the first, man must perfectly exercise his knowing faculty; and, since he teaches that the noblest object of knowledge is God, he implicitly states that the greatest happiness to be had here on earth consists in the knowledge of God. Happiness in this life has no essential reference to happiness in the life to come; that is to say, effort after knowledge here will not merit happiness hereafter: that will come in any case, for every soul will be happy after death. Cicero rebukes the sensualism of the Epicureans, criticizes the rigor of the Stoics, and declares that moderate pleasures and the possession of goods of life and fortune are aids to happy living. It is not clear whether Cicero made a distinction between the knowledge which leads to happiness and the means by which such knowledge is achieved; if he did not, his Ethics is certainly utilitarian. In speaking of the norm of morality Cicero says that we have from God a natural endowment for judging right and wrong: ultimately, then, this norm is the Divine Reason. If Cicero had been consistent he would have seen the necessity of teaching the sanctions (reward and punishment) of the life to come as the natural corollary of his doctrine on the norm of morality. Cicero agrees with the Stoics in regarding the passions as bad in themselves, and hence as things to be utterly suppressed and eradicated.
Jemarks,.l. Cicero’s doctrine is a perfect example of eclecticism, He borrows from the Skeptics and Stoics and other systems of philosophy. Yet he is not afraid to do his own reasoning on the adopted elements of his doctrine—but always with caution! Note his hesitancy, or, if you will, his diplomacy. He never makes an assertion with ringing positiveness; he tempers everything with the remark that, after all, one may not be too positive. Cicero was a politician as well as a philosopher, and the politician shows in all that he wrote. Leaving this weakness out of account, the philosophy of Cicero has about it a nobility that cannot fail to win the admiration of every reader.