The Consequences of Human Acts
Virtues and vices as the operative moral habits that human acts beget, with the cardinal virtues and their opposed vices.
Human acts tend to repeat themselves and to form habits, and since human acts have morality, the habit of performing them is a moral habit — a virtue if good, a vice if evil. A habit is a thing had, carried about with one like a uniform dress, and may affect a thing in its substance (entitative habit) or in its active powers (operative habit); virtues and vices are operative moral habits. Virtue, from the Latin virtus and vir, is literally manliness. Ethics deals only with acquired moral virtues, of which the chief are the cardinal virtues — prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance — so called from cardo, a hinge, since all moral virtues turn upon them. A vice is a morally evil operative habit, the habit of sin, standing opposed to virtue either by defect or by excess, since virtue stands in the middle. Glenn illustrates the vices opposed to each cardinal virtue in both directions.
Article 2. The Consequences of Human Acts
A man does more easily that which he has done before, and the more frequent the repetition of an act, the easier becomes its performance. In a word, human acts tend to form habits. Since human acts have morality, the habit of performing any human act will be a moral habit. If it is a good moral habit, it is a virtue. If it is an evil moral habit, it is a vice. Vice and virtue are not matters of a single human act, nor of an act once or twice repeated, but of an act frequently repeated. Frequent repetition of an act makes the agent strongly inclined towards that act, and in this strong inclination lies the active or operative habit of so acting.
Now the word “habit” is only the past participle of the Latin verb habere, “to have.” Literally, it is “thing had,” a thing possessed. It also involves the notion of some permanence in the possession. A habit is something that is close to one, that is, so to speak, carried about with one ordinarily, like a uniform dress—and, indeed, a uniform dress is called “a habit.” Habits may affect a thing in its substance (entitative habit) or in its active powers (operative habit). Thus, beauty or fatness is an entitative habit; painting or typewriting is an operative habit. Virtues and vices are operative moral habits.
a) Virtues
The word virtue comes from the Latin word virtus. This Latin word was military and meant the courage, the bravery of the soldier. The word is itself derived from the noun vir, a man. Hence, virtue is, quite literally, manliness; it is the mark and characteristic of the true and upright man. In Ethics, virtue signifies that habitual manliness and power for good acts which arises from the frequent performance of such acts. It has a special signification, too, and while we speak of virtue in general, as when we mention “a virtuous person” we also speak of virtues, using the plural advisedly, and referring to different habits of acting well the special name of different virtues. Thus we speak of the virtues of prudence, justice, etc. Thus, too, we speak of this or that virtue, or of a virtue.
A virtue may be natural or supernatural; it may be infused into the soul by God, or acquired by repeated acts; it may be a physical virtue, an intellectual virtue, a theological virtue, or a moral virtue. Thus, the native disposition one may have for study is a natural virtue; divine Faith is a supernatural virtue; fortitude is an acquired virtue; bodily strength or perfection is a physical virtue; wisdom is an intellectual virtue; faith is a theological virtue; fortitude is a moral virtue. In Ethics we deal only with acquired moral virtues.
An acquired moral virtue is a morally good operative habit. It is a moral habit of acting in accordance with the dictates of reason.
The chief moral virtues are: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. These are called cardinal virtues, and the name derives from the Latin cardo, a hinge; for as a door depends for its proper action in opening and closing upon its hinges, so do all moral virtues depend upon the “hinges” of the cardinal virtues. We shall say a word of each of these four virtues.
i. Prudence is that virtue of the understanding which enables one quickly and clearly to know, in concrete circumstances, the best means to an end, and it further inclines one to take these means promptly and accurately. Strictly, then, prudence is an intellectual virtue, not a moral (or “will” virtue), but we list it with the moral virtues because it has an immediate connection with the actual willing of the means to an end which this virtue enables the understanding to grasp. The marks of prudence, as we may learn from its definition, are a certain watchfulness and clear-sightedness, on the one hand, and cautious promptitude and precision on the other. A prudent man is never precipitate or headlong; he does not embroil or entangle a situation; he is not cock-sure, headstrong, or self-confident. Nor, on the other hand, is he weak, hesitant, or over-cautious. For the Christian, prudence, raised to the supernatural plane by grace, is a thoroughly fundamental virtue. The ancients counselled prudence in their axiom, “Virtue stands in the middle,” that is, virtue does not run to extremes; prudence preserves the “meson” or sane balance of Aristotle, and makes human action avoid the evil of falling too short or of overreaching its object; it makes human action fall just right according to the norm of right reason.
ii. Justice is the virtue which inclines one with constancy always to render to everyone his own. Man has, by his rational nature, a clear knowledge of something owed to God, to his country, and to his fellowmen. Justice is the virtue which steadily inclines man to recognize and pay this debt. A just man, therefore, is a religious man, an obedient, peace-loving, kind, grateful, and truthful man.
iii. Fortitude is the virtue which inclines one to face dangers with intrepidity, especially such dangers as threaten life. Fortitude, like all virtues, observes the “meson” or balance. It is not rashness, over-boldness, or presumptuous love of danger for its own sake or for ostentation; nor, on the other hand, is it supineness or dead submission. It involves a largeness of mind and soul, and combines with these the power of fadeless endurance.
iv. Temperance is the virtue which controls one in the pursuit and use of the pleasures of life, especially of those pleasures that attract most strongly, and in which there is a consequent danger of excess and disorder. Temperance keeps the desire and use of sense-pleasures particularly, within the bounds of right and reasonable action. Temperance, therefore, is not insensibility nor the extinction of natural tendencies. It is the regulation of tendencies, the sane self-mastery which reason (conscience) dictates.
b) Vices
A vice is a morally evil operative habit. A single evil human act is a sin. Vice is the habit of sin. We distinguish different vices inasmuch as different habits of sin stand opposed to virtues. For vice is a habitual lack of virtue; and it stands opposed to virtue either by defect or by excess. Virtue stands in the middle, being neither defective nor excessive when measured by the requirements of right reason; while vice lies upon either hand.
To give but a few examples of vice as opposed to the cardinal moral virtues:
Opposed to prudence by defect we find, among other vices, imprudence, precipitateness, lack of docility, carelessness, improvidence, etc. Opposed to prudence by excess, we find the vices of over-solicitude, smartness, trickery, fraud, etc.
Opposed to justice we find the vices of injustice, irreligion, impiety, irreverence, mendacity, ingratitude, cruelty, etc.
Opposed to fortitude we find weak-spiritedness, inconstancy, impatience, etc., as vices by defect; while we find the following as vices by excess: presumptuous boldness, stubbornness, insensibility, etc.
Opposed to temperance by defect we find pride, lust, anger, gluttony, etc.; while we find opposed by excess the vices of fanatical rigorousness, too great self-effacement of self-abjection, affectation, morose and gloomy conduct, etc.
Summary of the Article
This Article has taught us the meaning of virtue and vice, and has shown us how virtue preserves the sane balance of right reason, while vice sways the scale either to the side of defect or of excess.
The practical value of this present study should be the intellectual recognition of the value of good habits—of virtues. If reason requires man to act rightly, surely the same reason indicates the value of that which will make right action easy, natural, and “a second nature”—and this value is seen in virtues. Conversely, reason discerns the danger of that which makes right action more difficult, viz., vices. Thus, while it is not the first function of Ethics to furnish motives or appeals for upright living, but to give a cold scientific demonstration of what right living is, and merely to say what is to be done without explaining how it is to be done, still we cannot but take from the study of sound Ethics an urge to upright conduct. As Christians, we take an especial pleasure in finding the scientific exposition of the bases of morality and of the rational nature of good human action. No student of the science of Ethics, at least no Catholic student, can ever give intelligible utterance to such phrases as, “Oh, that’s old-fashioned morality!” “That is a bit of mid-Victorianism!” “People do not look at the matter so in our day!” “When in Rome, one must do as the Romans do!” and so forth.
End of General Ethics.