The Determinants of Morality

Summary of the Article

In this short Article we have learned much that is of prime importance. We have described morality; we have studied the Norm of Morality; we have defined morality and have explained the force of the definition. We have distinguished the morality of human acts as material and formal (or objective and subjective), and material morality as intrinsic and extrinsic.

Article 2. The Determinants of Morality

Since the morality of human acts consists in their relation to their norm (the measure of what they should be), it becomes necessary to ask, what points of contact exist between human acts and this norm. In other words, it is necessary to understand what phases of the human act may be measured by the norm. These points or phases, when measured by the norm, show the act as measuring up or not measuring up to that norm; in a word, these points determine the good or evil of the act. Hence they are called the determinants of morality.

Now the human act may be considered in itself as a deed done, i. e., as an object, and in its circumstances. These, then, are the determinants of the morality of the human act. In studying the act in its circum-stances, one circumstance stands out as most important, and we give it special consideration apart from all other circumstances of the act: this is the circumstance called the end of the agent. Thus we list three determinants of morality, viz., (a) the act itself (i. e., the object); (b) the end of the agent; (c) the circumstances other than the end of the agent.

A human act, to be a morally good act, must be found in agreement with the Norm of Morality on all three points, i. e., it must be good in itself or objectively, in its end, and in its circumstances. A human act is evil if it fails to conform with the Norm of Morality in any one of the points or determinants. This is expressed in the ancient axiom: “Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu” i. e., “A thing to be good must be entirely good; it is vitiated by any defect.” We may see the justice of the axiom by a rough analogy: A man to be a healthy man must have all organs functioning properly; while he is unwell even if only one organ (the heart, for example, or the stomach, or the liver) is diseased or deranged. Similarly, in human acts we find goodness dependent upon the agreement of the acts with the Norm of Morality on the score of all determinants; it is not enough that an act be good in itself; it must also be good in its end and in the circumstances that affect it as a moral act. But it is evil if it conflict with the moral law on any of the three points.

a) The Object

By the object is meant the human act performed, the deed done. If an act as object (i. e., in itself) is good or evil, we say—as we have learned—that it has objective morality. If an act, considered abstractly, is indifferent (i. e., neither good nor bad), its morality is determined by the end for which it is performed and by the circumstances which affect it. Now certain actions are in themselves, or objectively, good, and certain others are objectively evil: and this morality is intrinsic, i. e., resides in the act independently of positive law prescribing or forbidding the act. This assertion recommends itself at once to the normal mind as a true statement; yet some moralists have denied it. It is therefore necessary to prove briefly that some acts are intrinsically good, and some intrinsically evil.

Now those that deny the intrinsic morality of any human act must admit, as all other men do, that there are certain acts which have always and everywhere been regarded as good, and others which have been universally considered as evil. The acceptance of these acts as respectively good and evil is a fact to be explained. We explain it by stating the doctrine of intrinsic morality: men have always regarded certain acts as good in themselves because, as a matter of fact, they are good; and they have regarded others as intrinsically evil, because they are evil. Our opponents declare that what we call intrinsic morality is

THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS 105 merely the result of long established custom among men, or of special human legislation, or of the arbitrary decision of God’s will that some acts are good and some evil. In the inadequacy of these explanations we find the negative proof of our own position. Let us consider the matter in detail.

i. Custom cannot account for the universal acceptance of some acts as good in themselves and of other acts as intrinsically evil. How did the custom come into being? If as a dictate of right reason, because all people saw that certain things were in line with their rational desires and certain other things opposed to these, then the argument falls to nothing, and is merely an indefinite restatement of the true doctrine that certain acts are perceived by right reason as good and other acts as evil—in a word, that certain acts are perceived as intrinsically good or evil. If the custom did not arise as a dictate of right reason among men, then it arose out of circumstances. Since circumstances can be artificially arranged, it would be possible to get current a movement to change the present moral views of men. It would be possible, for example, to form a society, and to spread its influence generally throughout the human race, for the furtherance of murder and theft as virtuous acts! It would be possible to train men to the state of mind in which they could behold themselves robbed of their possessions not only without resentment, but with positive approval of the theft, and with veneration for the io6 ETHICS

thieves* as saintly men! It would be possible to have parents generally (always excepting a very few reactionaries) delighted with the ingratitude of their children. It would be possible to have those in authority reward disobedience and punish obedience; to throw the honest man in jail, and to elevate the malefactor as the model citizen. Then we should see men and women standing trial for murders they impiously failed to commit, for degradations to which they failed to sink, for slanders they failed to utter. But, you say, these things are utterly impossible. Then it is utterly impossible that the universal conviction of men concerning the intrinsic good and evil of human acts is a mere outgrowth of custom.

ii. Human legislation cannot account for the universal acceptance of some acts as good in themselves and of other acts as intrinsically evil. If human legislation means law in the true sense, then we are back in our own position, for true human law is an ordinance of reason in line with the Eternal Law, and it exists because there really are acts good in themselves to be prescribed, and acts evil in themselves to be forbidden. Acts are not good because true law prescribes them; they are prescribed by law because they are good. Nor are acts evil because true law forbids them; the law forbids them because they are evil. Certainly there are some acts (such as hunting out of season, driving at a certain rate of speed, etc.) which are not good or evil in themselves, and which fall under penal laws; but our question does not concern these. We are merely proving that some acts are intrinsically good, and others intrinsically evil; while our opponents deny all intrinsic morality of any and every act.—’ Now, if legislation be taken to mean, not a reasonable ordinance, but the whimsical and arbitrary decree of a ruler or ruling body, then legislation may change the whole scheme of morality. A “law” may be passed to-morrow making it imperative for sons to kill their fathers, for servants to rob their masters, for men to curse God, for spouses to be unfaithful; and such a “law” would not only make these crimes imperative, but virtuous. Then men, in time, would come to regard these acts of virtue in their true light, and we should find that murder would be everywhere regarded as noble. Fathers would embrace the slayers of their little children; mothers would rejoice in the shame of their daughters; employers would thank Heaven for the favor of dishonest employees! Such an impossible topsy-turvydom could not be created by legislation. Then neither could the existent moral scheme have been so created. If legislation be not guided by reason—which does not make, but only recognizes good and evil in human acts—then it might just as well and as easily produce the topsy-turvy morality described as the morality we actually acknowledge.

iii. The arbitrary decision of God’s will cannot account for the universal acceptance o.f some acts as good in themselves and of other acts as intrinsically evil. God is infinitely perfect; His acts are therefore infinitely right and reasonable. Hence an arbitrary decisions of the Divine Will without reference to the Divine Reason is so impossible as to be absolutely unthinkable. We have learned that God directs all acts and movements in the universe to their last end by the Eternal Law. Now, the Eternal Law is an ordinance of Divine Reason, and is put in effect by the Divine Will, not arbitrarily or gratuitously, but precisely because the Divine Reason recognizes it as right and reasonable. We speak of God in weak and inadequate human language, of course, and thus seem to separate the Divine Reason and Will; but as a matter of fact these are not separated, but are identical with the Divine Essence. Thus it follows that all the acts of God are infinitely reasonable; no divine act can be severed from Divine Reason. Thus to assert that God has unreasonably decided that certain things shall be good and other things evil, is to enunciate an absurdity.

In view of the truth established—viz., that there is such a thing as intrinsic morality—we are forced to reject many moral theories as false. Among those so rejected we find:

i. The Theory of Moral Instinct or Moral Sense (called Moral Intuitionism or Moral Sensualism), which asserts that we discern good and evil by a blind

THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS 109 instinct or by a sense faculty, and not by our understanding. We have seen that we know good and evil by the conscience-judgment, by reason. When we do good or evil as a human act, we know, we understand, that we are doing good or evil. Therefore, we do not act by blind instinct. Nor is our conscience a sense-judgment. For the relation of acts to the Norm of Morality is an abstract relation, not a material or bodily thing such as the senses require for their object.

ii. The Theory of Usefulness (called Utilitarianism), which asserts that what is discerned as useful (to individual men or to human society) is good, and what is found harmful is evil. It is true that good is ultimately useful, and evil harmful; but the usefulness comes from goodness, not goodness from usefulness; and harm fulness comes from evil, not evil from harmfulness. Certain human acts are, as we have proved, intrinsically good or evil; and hence their usefulness or uselessness can have nothing to do with their nature. Further, the theory of utilitarianism would make the code of morals as changeable as the stock-market rates; for what is useful (in a merely temporal and material sense) is variable and differs for times and persons: but the Norm of Morality, to be a norm or law, must be a stable thing. Again, how would the test of usefulness be established? Acts would have to be “tried out” first without any rule at no ETHICS

all to discover which acts might be listed as useful, and hence good, and which as harmful, and hence forbidden as evil.

To sum up: The object of a human act, the act itself as a deed done or to be done, that is, the act considered as a fact, has often its own intrinsic morality. Even if the act be in itself indifferent, it may have extrinsic morality, which is still objective, that is, as an object, the act may stand in harmony or in disagreement with the prescriptions of positive moral law. Hence, in determining whether any human act is good or evil, we look first to the object. The object is the primary determinant of morality. If the object be evil, our quest ends there; the act is definitely evil and forbidden; nothing can make it good. But if the act is good as an object, it may still be vitiated by its circumstances, particularly by that circumstance called “the end of the agent.” Hence, if we find an act good in itself as an object, we have still to look to the end of the agent and to the other circumstances before pronouncing it good and permissible as an individual act.

b) The End of the Agent

By the end of the agent we mean that which the agent (doer, performer of an act) intends or wishes to achieve by his act. It is the end he has in view, his purpose, his motive in performing the act.

A human act which is good in itself (i. e., as object) may still be evil by reason of the end (of the agent) for which it is performed. But a human act which is evil in itself cannot be made good by reason of the end for which it is performed. In other words, the influence of the end of the agent can be strong enough to swerve an act out of line with reason, but it cannot be strong enough to bring a bad act into line with reason. A daub of black paint will ruin a good picture, but a daub of white paint will not improve a bad picture. Thus, a man who spends money for the relief of poverty, but with the intention of fostering political corruption among his beneficiaries, performs an act which is objectively good—that is, an act good in itself, or good as an object; but the act is evil inasmuch as it is done with a bad purpose—that is, it is evil inasmuch as it is influenced by the end of the agent.

Now the question arises: How far does the influence of the end of the agent extend? Is a good act ruined entirely by a bad end? Is a bad act made worse by a bad end? What if there are several ends, or many, some good, some evil? The answer to these questions may be easily discerned in the following principles:

i. An objectively good act performed for a good purpose (i. e., a good end of the agent) takes on a new goodness from the good end; and if it have,several good ends, it takes on a new goodness from each. Thus, a man who gives alms to relieve distress, to honor God, and to do penance, performs an act which has a threefold goodness: objectively, it is an act of mercy; and in its ends it is an act of religion, and an act of the virtue of penance.

ii. An objectively evil act performed for an evil purpose (i. e., an evil end of agent) takes on a new malice or evil from the evil end; and if it have several evil ends, it takes on a new malice from each. Thus, a man who steals money in order to buy liquor with which to get another intoxicated and have him sign an unjust contract, performs an act in which there is a threefold malice or evil objectively, it is an act of injustice; and by reason of the evil ends it is an act of intemperance in cause, and an act of injustice to the signer of the contract.

iii. An act which is objectively good, but done for an evil end, is entirely evil if the evil end is the whole motive of the act; likewise the act is entirely evil if the evil end is gravely evil (i. e., mortally sinful), even though it is not the whole motive of the act; but the act is only partially evil if the evil end is neither gravely evil (i. e., is not mortally sinful) nor the whole motive of the act. Thus, to give money to a poor man in order to wean him away from the true faith, is an act entirely evil. Likewise, to assist in extinguishing a destructive fire with the purpose of stealing valuable property from the burning building, is an entirely evil act. But to give alms to the poor for the purpose of relieving distress and with the added intention of gaining a little prominence as a

THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS 113 beneficent person, is an act partially good and partially (but not gravely) evil.

iv. An objectively evil act can never become good by reason of a good end. The primary determinant of morality is the object, the act itself. If an act in itself is evil, it is and remains evil in spite of every circumstance. The end does not justify the means. The end does specify the means: that is, supposing a choice of different means all of which are good, the nature of the end in view will determine which of the available good means is to be chosen as most suitable or practicable. But there is no end, however good, that can justify an evil means, however slightly evil. Thus we see that there is nothing but folly in expressions like the following that too often fall from the lips of thinking men (perhaps even from the lips of graduates of Catholic colleges): “It’s all in one’s intention ”I do not look at the matter as you do; I do not consider it wrong; therefore it is not wrong for me“There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.”

v. An act which is indifferent objectively becomes good if done for a good end, and evil if done for an evil end. Thus, to sing in order to praise God, or to please one’s guests, or even to charm one’s own ears, is a good act. But to sing in order to annoy a person who desires quiet is an evil act, being an offense against charity.

c) The Circumstances

Circumstances are conditions that affect an act— and may affect it morally—although they do not belong to the essence of the act as such. In other words, circumstances are conditions without which the act could exist, but which happen to affect or qualify it in its concrete performance. Examples of circumstance are place, time, company, etc., in which an act is performed.

We enumerate seven circumstances. These are usually set forth in the mnemonic Latin line: Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando? Which may be freely translated as follows:

Who, what, where- with what ally,

In what condition, when, and why?

To explain these circumstances in detail:

who? Circumstance of person. Who is the agent? To whom is the action done? John strikes a man; the act is evil; but it takes on an added evil, and here a new evil, for the person struck is John’s father.

what? Circumstance of quantity or quality of the object (i. e., the act). What is the extent of the act? Was the injury inflicted serious or slight? Was the amount stolen large or small?

where? Circumstance of place. A theft committed in the presence of the Blessed Sacrament is theft plus sacrilege, the latter evil coming from the circumstance of place.

with what ally? Circumstance of means or instrument. (This “ally” does not mean “companion,” for the latter circumstance is that of person.) A sin of drunkenness committed through the expenditure of stolen money takes on an added evil from the circumstance of means, i. e., stolen money.

in what condition? How? Circumstance of manner. Was the agent in good faith or bad? Was the agent’s evil disposition intensely malicious or only slightly so?

when? Circumstance of time. Did the agent miss Mass on Sunday, or on a day when he was not obliged to attend? How long did the agent retain an evil thought or intention, for a long period or momentarily?

why? Circumstance of end of the agent. This circumstance has already been discussed in detail.

Some circumstances merely increase or diminish the good or evil of the object (i. e., act as such). Other circumstances add to the act a new good or evil, differing in nature or species from that of the act. Thus, the circumstance of time in the case of an evil intention long entertained merely increases the evil, merely makes the act worse, but leaves it unaltered, or rather, with no new kind of evil added. Robbing a church, however, adds to the evil of theft the new evil of sacrilege, thus changing the nature of the evil act from a simple to a complex one. The circumstances which merely increase or diminish the moral quality of an act, leaving it in the same species or nature, are called circumstances which make the act better or worse. The circumstances that add a specifically new moral character to the act are called circumstances that change the nature of the act.

The ethical principles involved in the matter of circumstances as determinants of morality are the following:

i. An indifferent act becomes good or evil by reason of its circumstances. That is to say, an act which is indifferent in itself as object, takes its moral quality from its circumstances. Thus, to eat meat is an act in itself indifferent. But to eat meat on a day of abstinence is evil; and the evil comes from the circumstance of time.

ii. A good act may become evil by reason of circumstances. Thus, to pray to God is a good act objectively. But to pray to God for misfortune to befall an enemy is an evil act by reason of the end of the agent—a circumstance already fully considered. Further it involves evil from the circumstance of person, for such a prayer is an insult to the All-Perfect God.

hi. A good or evil act (objectively) may become better or worse by reason of circumstances, and may even take on specifically new goodness or malice from its circumstances. This matter has been treated in the paragraph on circumstances which make the act better or worse, and circumstances that change the nature of the act.

iv. An evil act can never be made good by circumstances.

v. A circumstance which is gravely evil (mortally sinful) destroys the entire goodness of an objectively good act. Thus, to do charity with stolen money is evil by reason of the circumstance of means or instrument.

vi. A circumstance which is evil, but not gravely so (not mortally sinful), does not entirely destroy the goodness of an objectively good act. Thus, to pray carelessly and lazily does not entirely destroy the goodness of the act of prayer, although the full goodness of the act is injured by the circumstance of manner.

Summary of the Article

In this Article we have learned what is meant by the determinants of morality, and we have found these to be the object and the circumstances of the human act. Of the circumstances we distinguished the end of the agent as a matter of special importance to be studied in detail.

We asserted the existence of objective morality, and showed that many acts have intrinsic morality— that they are good or evil in themselves as such. In this phase of our study we perceived that the moral ri8 ETHICS

schemes called Utilitarianism and Moral Sensualism are utterly inadequate, nay, insane. We found, too, that the theory which traces morality to the absolute and gratuitous decree of the Divine Will, without reference to the Divine Reason, involves an essential contradiction.

In our study of the end of the agent as a determinant of morality the following principles came to light:

i. A good act done for a good end takes on an added or a new goodness from the end, and from each good end that influences the act.

ii. A bad act done for an evil end takes on an added or a new malice from the end, and from each evil end that influences the act.

iii. A good act done for an evil end is wholly evil if the end is the complete motive for the act or if the end, while only a partial motive, is gravely evil. A good act done for an end slightly evil and not the whole motive of the act, is only partially vitiated.

iv. An evil act can never become good by reason of a good end.

v. An indifferent act is good if done for a good end, evil if for an evil end.

We have studied the influence of circ/mstance upon the morality of human acts, discerning he following principles in the matter:

1. An indifferent act becomes good or evil by reason of its circumstances.

ii. A good act may become evil by reason of circumstances.

iii. An act may become better or worse, or may take on a new goodness or evil by reason of circumstances. iv. An evil act can never be made good by circumstances.

v. A gravely evil circumstance entirely vitiates a good act.

vi. A slightly evil circumstance does not entirely vitiate a good act.