Dynamism
Dynamism as the theory that bodies are constituted by forces alone without extended matter; its forms and critique.
Dynamism is defined both nominally, from the Greek dynamis (power), and really: it is the system which explains the world of bodies in terms of non-extended, non-quantified points of force or power, acting and reacting among themselves across a void. Glenn traces its ancestry to Plato and the Pythagoreans and its modern statement to Leibnitz, Boscovich and Wolff, with Giordano Bruno and Kant also noticed. On this view the points of power have no magnitude, approach one another only to a determined distance and then hold one another off, acting across a vacuum (actio in distans), and undergo no transformation of nature. The theory is found deficient and unacceptable on several counts: it conflicts with the findings of sense and of reason; it denies, at least equivalently, the substantial character of bodies and of the world; it involves the self-contradictions of extension born of inextension and of phenomena with no stage on which to appear; it teaches the impossible doctrine of actio in distans; and it fails to explain continuity or unity in bodily being and function. The extreme form of the modern electrical theory of matter is noticed as a kindred view.
Article 3. Dynamism
a) Meaning of Dynamism
The term dynamism is taken from the Greek word dynamis which means “force” or “power.” We have several words in English which derive from this source; for instance, dynamic, dynamo, dynasty. Thus dynamism, by reason of its etymology, suggests some theory of power or force as the explanation of the material world.
b) Tenets of Dynamism
Dynamism is not a clear- cut system, but has various forms, and perhaps its most notable effects are found in the influence it brings to bear on scientific and philosophical systems which are not purely dynamistic. However, it is possible to select out a few points of doctrine which all dynamists (pure or mixed) defend. Thus dynamism holds: (a) that bodies are made up of non-extended, non-quantified elements; (b) that these elements are points of force or power; (c) that these points attract one another up to a certain stage or distance, and then hold one another off; thus they act upon one another across a vacuum or void (actio in distans); (d) that the points of power are changeless, undergoing no transformation of nature when they combine to form bodies.
Notable names associated with the history of dynamism are, among the ancients, the Pythagoreans of the 6 century B.c.; Zeno of Elea of the 5 century B. C.; and, in a very limited way, the great Plato of the 5 and 4-centuries B.c. In modern times, Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), Wilhelm Gottfried Leibnitz (1646-1716), Christian Wolff (1679-1754), Giuseppe Boscovich (1711-1787), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906) are listed as dynamists in their interpretation of the nature of bodies.
c) Estimate of Dynamism
Dynamism contradicts the definition of substance and turns the world into a non-substantial reality. For it defines bodies in terms of their accidents, and thus makes the universe a great mass of accidents without anything substantial in which to inhere. A power or force is in itself a quality, and leads on to function or action; and philosophy lists both qualities and actions as accidents, that is, as realities which are not regularly suited for existence themselves (that is, alone), but for existence as the marks, limitations, characterizations, or modifications of something else.
Again, dynamists either admit the real extension of the universe, and of bodies in the world, or they call the extension merely apparent. (a) If they admit real extension, they are wholly illogical, for extension cannot be the product of inextended elements: zero added to zero will still be zero. Nor can they affirm that the inextended points of power (which are the constituents of all bodies) are actually held at a distance from one another and thus effect a truly extended body; for inextended points with nothing whatever between and among them still results in an inextended totality. (b) If the dynamists call the world a mere apparent world, they have still to explain the apparition, and this they cannot do in terms of their own philosophy. They say,—some of them, —that we get the impression of continuity in bodies from the fact that the point-forces are in perpetual motion, just as we get the impression of a continuous ring of fire from a torch that is whirled rapidly in a circle. The illustration is objectionable on two counts: First, the flame of the torch is actually extended; there is no illusion about that to start with; whereas, according to dynamism, the whirling point-forces are inextended and thus invisible in themselves, and they are certainly not rendered visible by being moved rapidly about. Secondly, an illusion is due to a misapplication of actual experience; before we can have an illusion of continuity or solidity, we must have had some experience of what actual continuity or solidity is; but dynamism renders this prerequisite experience impossible, and hence destroys the possibility of illusion.
Dynamism openly professes the activity of point-forces on one another across a void. This actio in distans means activity without a channel to convey the activity. We have already considered this actiontheory, and have found it inadmissible.
Finally, dynamism cannot explain the unity of organic parts in a living body; it cannot explain the unity of constituting parts in molecule or atom in lifeless matter. It cannot explain unity at all. For points of force, inextended and always invariable in nature, cannot really enter upon unity without compenetration. To avoid this, actio in distans has to be admitted, and actio in distans (could it exist) is certainly fatal to organic or inorganic unity.
The extreme type of the modern “electrical theory of matter” is neither more nor less than dynamism. Most modern physicists accept the theory of electrically-charged particles of matter, and this is quite intelligible and does not come into conflict with reason. But the extremists do not say that the particles of matter (protons and electrons) are electrically charged; they say that these particles are no true particles of matter at all but only points of electric power. This, as we have said, is dynamism pure and simple, and is to be rejected for the reasons alleged above.
Summary of the Article
In this Article we have defined dynamism literally or nominally, and we have also given its real definition which presents it as a system or philosophy which attempts to explain the world of bodies in terms of non-extended, non-quantified, points of force or power acting and reacting among themselves across a void. We have found this philosophy deficient and unacceptable for many reasons: it conflicts with the findings of sense and of reason; it denies, at least equivalently, the substantial character of bodies and of the world; it involves in itself the self-contradictions of “extension born of inextension” and of “phenomena without any stage on which to appear”; it teaches the impossible doctrine of actio in distant; it fails utterly to explain continuity or unity in bodily being and function. We have noticed that the extreme form of the modern “electrical theory of matter” is a dynamistic system, and is, for this reason, inadmissible.